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Abstract
This study discusses some empirical findings on various computer and Internet-related crimes. An appropriate
diffusion model was used that encompassed modeling of two opposite behaviors—imitation and deterrence acts.
The model also is adequate for handling sparse data.  The model was used to analyze various types of attack.
The results shows that different types of attacks follow different types of growth, that increase in imitation is
related to an increase in deterrence, and that imitation rates are much higher than deterrence rates. Model
validation results are also included.
Keywords:  Security attacks, Gompertz model, sparse data, deterrence, imitation, validation
Introduction
Computer and Internet-related crimes show no signs of abatement. A 2002 survey conducted by the CSI/FBI reports that ninety
percent of surveyed large corporations and agencies detected computer security breaches within the last twelve months and eighty
percent of them acknowledged financial losses due to computer breaches (Power, 2002). According to a CERT/CC report (2002)
computer security vulnerabilities more than doubled in 2001 with 1,090 separate holes reported in 2000, and 2,437 reported in
2001. Following the same trends, the number of reported incidents also drastically increased with 21,756 documented in 2000
and 52,658 in 2002. Through the continual 24 x 7 monitoring of hundreds of Fortune 1000 companies, Riptech has discovered
that general Internet attack trends are showing a 64% annual rate of growth (http://www.riptech.com).   
Newmann (1999) mentions that the costs of cyber crime are difficult to measure, however, they are reasonably substantial and
growing exponentially. Other researchers (Lukasik, 2000) claim that costs are essentially doubling each year. The problem gets
even more complicated when one considers that these crimes are underreported. Ullman and Ferrera, (1998) mention that
according to FBI estimates, only 17 percent of computer crimes are reported to government authorities. 
However, not all attacks deserve the same attention and not all attacks may show same type of growth rate. It is important to know
how these various crime rates are growing. This needs to be empirically investigated. Although estimation with a sparse set of
data at an earlier stage of growth is challenging, it has been proved in past studies to be useful.   In this paper, we focus on
different types of attacks, how these have evolved, whether different types of attacks have evolved similarly and how deterrence
effects are working. 
The study is preliminary in nature. The reasons are as follows. Literature is almost non-existent on this topic. Data on different
types of security breaches are sparse (Power, 2002). One of the most referred studies of security breaches, the CSI/FBI computer
crime and security survey made by  Richard Power, contains only a recent few years of data (1996-2002).  Modeling such security
breaches during the early stages of data availability is difficult but extremely critical. Analysis with sparse data is, however, not
uncommon in research literature. For example, marketing literature reports forecasting of sales of new products with as few as
five years of data (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). The dynamic behavior of hundreds of good innovations has shown similar
characteristics during the early phases of growth as observed across many types of products (Bass, 1969; Mahajan et al., 1985;
Jepson, 1976). Previous research report that the shape of sales curves of many innovative products, during the growth phase is
similar (Mahajan et al., 1985).  Sales of new products in the early phases tend to grow extremely rapidly. This high growth rate
tends to decrease over time and finally the diffusion matures and tapers off, as newer technologies replace older ones.   Previous
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research have also found that in the growth phase, exponential or logistic curves are typically used for modeling purposes, which
however, are inadequate to model any innovation at an earlier stage. A small error at this stage can have a large effect on later
time period forecasts (Martino, 1972). 
Modified Gompertz curves such as the General Sales Growth Curve (Sparse data, 2002) have been reported which describes the
data well and yields good curve fitting and forecasting of new innovations in the early growth phases (Jepson, 1976; Lakhani,
1979). The Gompertz curve could be a good fit for innovations which rapidly increases in the beginning and then tapers off
slowly. Its point of inflection occurs when at 33% of total potential diffusion. Such a model is used in the present study of bad
innovations. 
Types of Security Breaches
Some of the important security breaches in 2001 were the results of the following attacks (CERT/CC, 2003): multiple
vulnerabilities in the Internet Software Consortium's Berkeley Internet Name Domain [BIND] server, Sadmind/IIS worm (a worm
that exploits a vulnerability in Solaris systems and subsequently installs software to attack Microsoft IIS web servers), CodeRed
worm (a self-propagating malicious code that exploits IIS-enabled systems), SirCam worm (a malicious code that spreads through
email and potentially through unprotected network shares), and Nimda blended threat (a combination of worm, viruses, etc. that
propagates itself via several methods, including email, network shares, or through an infected web site). Security breaching
techniques have come a long way from early hacker-induced attacks of 1970s. Sophisticated attacks include superior software
techniques that are increasingly difficult to separate out from normal network traffic. An automated such sophisticated attack
consists of four phases: (1) scanning for potential victims, (2) compromising vulnerable systems, (3) propagating the attack, and
(4) coordinated management of attack tools (Householder et al., 2002).  To increase attack efficiency, scanning and attack tools
are integrated and attack cycles are also automatically initiated. Distributed attack tools are common.  
The main types of reported popular Internet-based attacks are denial of service, worm and virus, domain name system (DNS),
router attacks and web defacement.  The denial of service attack prevents legitimate users in using the service typically by
flooding a network or disrupting connections or services. An example of such attack was Mafia Boy attack from February 7-9,
2000 on web sites such as Yahoo.com, CNN.com, and Amazon.com.  The web sites went out of service for more than two hours
costing $1.2 billion in loss in businesses (CCITS, 2002).  A worm is a self-propagating malicious piece of code and is highly
automated. An example of a worm is Robert Morris' Internet Worm, which was released on November 2-3, 1988.  The worm
crashed more than six thousand computers on the Internet.  Top-level domain servers are potentially vulnerable and any attack
on these can cause widespread problems.  There are viruses which can be spread by executing infected programs. An example
of a destructive virus is “I love you,” which appeared in May 2000, took five hours to spread and cost some $10 billion in damages
and lost productivity (CCITS, 2002). Sometimes when the infected program runs, it may wipe out the hard disk and do other
damage. Routers, which are devices used to direct traffic on a network, can be attacked in several ways such as by denial of
service or by using the router as an attack platform. It is no surprise that many corporate network professionals cite e-mail parasite
(62%) and spam (17%) as the two most damaging types of external security attacks. CSI/FBI report (2002) talk about many other
types of computer and Internet-based attacks or misuses such as financial and telecom fraud, telecom eavesdropping, sabotage,
laptop misuse, active wiretap, insider abuse of net access, to name a few. We also treat Web defacement as a separate type of
attack, because of its importance and recent frequency (more than 50 a day in 2002, http://www.cnetnews.com).  Reasons for
web defacement are similar as other types of hack attacks: electronic graffiti, getting attention, intellectual challenge etc. to name
a few. Domains such as .gov, .mil, .com are frequently targeted for web defacement attacks. Mirror web sites such as Alldas.de,
attrition.org and safemode.org have chronicled this phenomenon. They have also been closed down by hacker attacks. 
Deterrent Methods and Tools
As security breaching techniques got refined, so also was security attack detection and prevention techniques. There are several
tools available to firms to combat security attacks. Firewalls can provide ongoing protection to a firm.  Firewalls are placed
between the company network and the Internet.  They can deny suspicious traffic.  To inform companies when they are under
attack, another system called the intrusion detection system (IDS) is needed.  An IDS examines all packets and prepares a log file.
The security administrator examines the log file to look for suspicious patterns and generate messages for possible attacks.  If an
attack packet passes through the firewall, the next line of defense is to prepare the host from possible attacks by installing vendor-
specific current patches for known weaknesses in the system.  A large number of attacks emerge from known weaknesses in
popular software. Security systems are also designed to prevent eavesdropping attacks.  Secure communication is ensured when
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the checks for authenticity, integrity and confidentiality are maintained. Many techniques such as biometrics, digital IDs,
encrypted logins, anti-virus software, access control mechanism are additionally used to prevent attacks (Power, 2002). Not all
of them are universally effective or popular in use.
Sometimes, an attacker succeeds by breaking all systems.  This is called a security incident.  Companies need to have good plans
for incident handling (also called incident response).  This includes stopping the attacks, restoring the system to its pre-attack state,
and possibly prosecuting the attacker (or punishing an employee attacker administratively).  In case when a firm’s security
administration fails, Internet security sites as mentioned above can provide help. Organizations such as CSI, CERT, NIPC,  IEEE
task force (IEEE, 2002) on security and privacy, lend enormous deterring efforts to stop hacking that maliciously damage the
academic, government and business activities.
The security infrastructure and security providers no doubt act as a deterrent to attempts of such breaches by sustained organized
efforts.  Security laws and regulations of a nation additionally aid the deterrent side of the equation.  The U.S. government already
has some regulations in place.  These are related to computers, access devices and communication lines, stations and systems.
As an example, the computer fraud and abuse statute 1030 can be cited.  The statute states that if anyone knowingly or
intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, he/she is liable to be punished (NSI, 2002).
International efforts are also not lacking.  Forty-one European countries, plus the U.S., Canada and Japan attended a recent
convention on cyber crime.  These nations signed a treaty that supplies a legal framework aimed at the protection of society
against cyber-crime (Conventions, 2002). 
A Model of Security Breach/Attacks
Many researchers have studied the Computer/IS security issues (Atkins, 1996; Parker, 1983; Straub, 1990).  Straub and his
research partners have used general deterrence theory in IS environment (Straub, Carlson, and Jones, 1994; Straub, 1990; Straub
and Nance, 1990; Hoffer and Straub, 1989).  The basic argument in this body of work is that information security actions can deter
potential computer abusers from committing illegal acts. They also have found empirical evidence that security actions can lower
systems risk.  
However, previous studies lack in empirical results on how different types of attacks grows or providing reliable models of such
attack growths. This is important, as some attacks enormously and rapidly disrupt the Internet infrastructure for a length of time,
thus resulting in millions of dollars in loss. Take the example of the “Code Red Worm” virus.  It infected more than 250,000
systems around the globe in 9 hours on July 19, 2001 and its estimated total global economic impact was $2.6 billion
(Householder et al., 2002). 
The growth process can be studied from an innovation diffusion perspective (Rogers, 1991).  Innovation diffusion literature is
usually concerned with good innovations and thus biased towards good innovations.  The study of bad innovations such as security
attacks can alert readers to the fact that innovations are not always good and what could be done to prevent such bad innovations.
This is done in the present study.  There are four main elements in the diffusion process: (1) the innovation (good or bad), (2)
channels of communication, (3) time, and (4) the social system.  In the present case, examples of channels could be direct word-of-
mouth or mass media communication channels including the Internet/Web.  Time is the rate at which the innovation is diffused
and the social system is the system of all potential and existing attackers. 
Ideally, a growth model is needed that can capture both deterrence as well as imitation activities to model the security breaching
incidents.  However, traditional diffusion models do not provide the necessary explanatory power to analyze the attack
phenomenon adequately (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). 
The Gompertz Model
The modified Gompertz model used by Pitcher et al. (Pitcher et al., 1978) assumes that the probable causes for the outbreak of
such incidents are imitative as well as inhibitive in nature. The imitative aspect is based on incident news spread via the Internet
as well as by word-of-mouth; the inhibitive aspects can also be spread via Internet/Web sites and related stories. However, people
only engage in security attacks when they feel threatened or are motivated by some economic or other gain and have observed
the success of earlier attackers (Bandura, 1986). Traditionally, the challenge or threat to such attackers has been mostly an
intellectual one:  to break a system. To quote a hacker expert, “It's the sheer challenge (to crack a code or break a system) rather
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than any  (criminal intent). They see it as an intellectual challenge and a prize, (and) they look at the success of what they have
done rather than the consequences of the lives of people they have affected” (Dreyfus, 2002). Of course, as mentioned earlier,
other types of challenges come, for instance, from making money or taking economic or political advantage. The more successful
the earlier attackers are, the more aggressive the behavior of the present attacker becomes. Each such incident is an imitation of
previous behavior and a behavioral model for others to imitate. On the other hand, the increase of security activities and success
stories about preventing such attacks could reduce the number of attacks. Thus, a combination of imitation and inhibition as
assumed by the asymmetric model could provide a realistic background in modeling such incidents.
The model can be expressed mathematically as:
)()( tNec
dt
tdN qt
⋅⋅=
−
where, t = time, N (t) = cumulative number of attack incidents at time t and c, q are parameters of the models.  The parameter c
denotes the net rate of instigation to attacks and q denotes the rate of inhibition in such attacks.
We model the growth process as a combination of such influences as well as preventive efforts by various agencies to curb such
incidents.  Our analysis suggests that the growth  was indeed influenced by a combination of factors:  attacks by like-minded peers
(hackers or crackers) and attack-preventive measures put forward by various governments, academic and security agencies.  The
results have implications for everyone - from security professionals and merchants associated with on-line trade over the Internet
to academics, professionals and other day-to-day users of the Internet/Web.
Hypothesis Formulation
Although imitative and deterrence acts constitute the background of any attack scenario, the rates of imitation and deterrence may
not be same. When the rate of instigation increases it may mean an overall increase in deterrence rate as more and more security
products will be developed. As these products come into the market, attackers find ways to bypass these products and refine their
attacks, which in turn makes the security products more refined. This cycle of reinforcing each other (i.e., attack and deterrence)
continues (Pitcher et al., 1978). 
Hypothesis 1. Relative increase in instigation rate is related to relative increase in deterrence rate.
Sofaer et al. (2000), observe that “the risks of cyber terrorism and cyber crime vastly outweigh our abilities to control those risks
by technological means, although technology can help and should be vigorously pursued.” Thus preventive measures are assumed
to be thoroughly outweighed by attacks. Therefore it is expected that value of c, the rate of instigation will be much higher than
the value of q, the rate of deterrence or inhibition.
Hypothesis 2. Values of c, the net rate of instigation will be much higher than values of q, the rate of
inhibition for computer and Internet-related bad innovations, i.e., digital crimes and security
breaches.
Data
Richard Power (2002) has gathered data on some aspects of cyber crime from 1997 onwards. The survey called “Annual CSI/FBI
Computer Crime and Security Survey” gathers data based on survey questionnaire sent to information security practitioners in
US organizations. The response rate for the 2002 survey was 14% with 503 practitioners responding. This data set is used for the
present study. We used total annual loss data which was available in US dollar value. The data were converted to 1996 US dollar
value by dividing by the price deflator for each year.
For the 2002 survey, questionnaires were distributed to 3,500 information security professionals with a 14% response. The
responses were anonymous. Job titles of respondents ranged from corporate information security manager and data security officer
to senior systems analyst. Organizations surveyed included corporations, financial institutions, government agencies and
universities. 
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For web-defacement, we use monthly defacement incident data from January, 1995-July 2000, based on data gathered by a
mirroring firm named Attrition (http://www.attrition.org/mirror/attrition/stats.html) Attrition began actively mirroring defaced
sites since 1995. However, it had to close down in 2002, due to hacker attacks.
Data Analysis Method
The data analysis method used in this paper is a non-linear least square regression scheme. We used SPSS to design and run the
non-linear model described above, with different sets of data. Non-linear equations are sometimes known to be difficult to
converge. The convergence problem is handled with suitable initial values of parameters. The Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm
(SPSS, 2003) is mostly used to determine  parameter values of interest, q and c.
Results
Hypothesis 1. Relative increase in net instigation rate is related to relative increase in inhibition rate. 
Figure 1 shows the result for hypothesis 1. The figure captures the fit of the power function of the relationship between q and c.
The function is:  q = .075c(1.95) (R2 = .58). An increase in instigation rate is greater than the corresponding relative increase in
inhibition rate. This is consistent with results obtained from other types of crimes (Pitcher et al., 1978). The moderate fit and the
positive value of c supports hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2. Values of net instigation rate, c, will be much higher than values of inhibition rate, q, for
computer and Internet-related bad innovations, i.e., computer crimes and security breaches.
Table 1 contains results from running the model for various types of computer crimes and security breaches. The R2 value from
the model fits are very high (.96-.99). The values of q and c are very different, for each type of security breach, with values of
c much higher than q. When  c  > q, it means that overall impact of net instigation is more than inhibition rate and vice versa.
Figure 1.  Inhibition Rate (q) by the Net instigation Rate (c)
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Table 1.  q and c Values from the Model of Various Attack Types
Items Upper limit of cost R2 q c
Theft of proprietary info. 5.94E+07 0.99 0.1555 1.029
Sabotage of data of networks 2.41E+07 0.95 0.1165 .8211
Telecom eavesdropping 8.12E+10 0.96 0.001 .457
System penetration by outsider 5.31E+12 0.99 0.002 .62
Insider abuse of Net access 8.62E+06 0.99 0.246 2.132
Financial fraud 1.74E+10 0.99 0.054 .644
Denial of service 2.79E+06 0.99 0.191 1.295
Virus 1.85E+14 0.98 0.025 .545
Web defacement 1.096E+11*
(*unit is number of 
incidents)
.98 .0073 .1794
The difference in mean values of q and c is significant (t=-4.19, p<.001), thereby suggesting that q and c are statistically different.
The results are again consistent with the results obtained from other types of crimes (Pitcher et al., 1978). This confirms
hypothesis 2.
Figure 2. The Web Defacement Data and Predictions
Discussions and Conclusions
How robust is the model fit using the sparse data model? We could check that only for Web defacement case, as it had enough
monthly data. Monthly data are more susceptible to fluctuations than yearly data. We used 10 data points for building the model
and 10 successive data points for prediction, using the Gompertz model. Predictions up to 27 additional months are reasonable,
after which the estimates deteriorate. For the first 10 forecasts, predicted value exceeded three times 100% of the actual value.
Thus 30% of forecasts were off by more than 100%.  The average error for the 10-month forecast was 66%. For the entire 27
months, predictions exceeding 100% greater than actual values were 14 in number, or roughly half the time as shown in figure 2.
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The exponential or the logistic fits would likely to perform much worse, when compared with this model. Thus this model can
act as a reasonable tool for short-term predictions.
Of the two hypotheses explored in this study, both were strongly confirmed while the remaining two were partially confirmed.
In summary, the results of this study have led us to conclude that:
• Relative increase in net instigation rate is related to relative increase in inhibition rate which implies that the increasing
attack incidences will force organizations and governments to come up with means of preventing or reducing them;
• For computer and Internet-related attacks (bad innovations), the values of net instigation rate is higher than values of
inhibition rate which implies that much more efforts and resources need to be applied toward inhibiting attacks; and
• Different computer crimes and security breaches grow at different rates, which implies that these crimes should not
receive the same level of attention because some crimes are likely to spread more rapidly than other.
This article is a first attempt to identify the nature of growth of various computer and Internet-related crimes, using a sparse set
of data. First, a model was selected for bad innovation modeling which can represent both imitative and inhibitive behaviors in
attacks. Next, the model was used to predict and compare various types of attacks with a sparse set of data.  Although the model
used is an ideal one for such purposes, it may still yield forecast errors that can only be refined with the progress of time. So the
results should be interpreted with caution. However, our objective is to obtain and compare preliminary growth estimates of
various attacks and this paper does indicate how different such crimes are growing. 
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